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National trade remedy  laws have  a long,  although not a particularly honorable,  history.
Laws to govern "unfair"  trading practices were put into place in the United States [US],  early
in the twentieth  century, to deal with predatory pricing by foreign firms  (antidumping  [AD]
law)  and government subsidized  foreign competition (countervailing  duty  [CVD] law).  In
addition,  the  US has trade remedy  laws to protect domestic  industries from fairly traded
imports  (Section 201  - Escape Clause  of the Trade Act  of 1974).  National Administered
Protection Agencies [NAPAs]  are charged with the application of these laws and they are the
primary focus of this paper.
Internationally,  the rules governing  AD and  CVDs have  been  a continuous  source  of
controversy in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT].  The US has generally
taken a position in favor of more stringent AD/CVD laws.  Other countries view contingency
protection  laws as a way to harass and impede  imports.  The GATT  (1947)  allowed  for
AD/CVD laws through Articles VI and XVI.  While Article VI required  an injury test, US
CVD law in 1947 did not, and this departure  from GATT  rules was grandfathered  into the
Agreement.  In accepting the Tokyo Round  Subsidies Code, the US agreed to an injury test
for countervailing duty cases relating to dutiable imports (CBO  1994).  Significant changes
were made in AD/CVD law as a result of the Uruguay Round  [UR]  of trade negotiations.
Schott argues that the Uruguay Round Agreement [URA]  on countervailing  duties represents
considerable  progress while the new rules on anti-dumping  are a disappointment. 2
National administered  protection agencies not only take AD/CVD  actions  against the
unfair trading practices  of foreign exporters,  but these agencies also provide input into the
proceedings  of other  forms  of trade  remedy  measures.  The  US  International  Trade
Commissions [USITC] has recently carried out  Section  332 investigations of the Canadian
beef cattle and durum wheat industries  and it provided economic  analysis  of the US Section
22 investigation of Canadian durum wheat exports.
*Financial support for this project was provided by the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture  and
Rural Affairs and the Social  Science and Humanities Research  Council.
1For CVD investigations the changes include:  1]  specific time schedules for decisions,  2] a
higher de minimus level, 3] a five year sunset provision, 4] the opportunity for consumers of
the foreign product to make representations,  5] different rules for developing nations, and 6]
an appeals  process (Schott  1994).  Most importantly,  World Trade Organization  [WTO]
panel  reports  cannot  be blocked  from  adoption except  by  consensus.  The WTO  rules
governing  AD  and CVD  actions are  not self-executing,  hence  these procedures  must be
incorporated  into  domestic  legislation  and  applied  by  national  administered  protection
agencies like the US International Trade Commission [USITC].
2There are several excellent surveys of these issues (CBO  1994; USITC  1995; Schott 1994).
195Background
It  is instructive  to begin  by  asking  if AD/CVD  laws  are  important  in  international
commerce?  There are some facts which would suggest that they are not.  First, although 40
countries have AD/CVD laws,  only a few countries are heavy users of these laws;  namely, the
US, Canada, EU and Australia.  Trade remedy  laws are used only rarely by other developed
countries and almost never by developing  countries.  Second,  in  agriculture AD/CVDs are
seldom applied to the imports of major commodities.  They find their most heavy use, in the
US, against products like cut flowers, red raspberries,  kiwi fruit and fresh asparagus.  Third,
of the 1,112 AD/CVD cases filed in the US between 1980  and  1992 only 34.2 percent ended
with affirmative  outcomes and final duties being applied (DeVault  1993).  Finally, in only one
year  (1982)  did the subject imports  account  for more than  1 percent of total US  imports
(USITC 1995).  Based on this evidence, it might be argued that AD/CVD laws are of no real
consequence to international  commerce.
This  would  be  an  erroneous  perception.  First,  although  only  34.2  percent  of US
AD/CVD  cases  ended  in final  affirmative  duties,  DeVault  calculates  that  fewer than  25
percent result in negative outcomes.  The remainder of the cases  involved the application of
provisional  duties  or  were  concluded  with  price  agreements  and/or  voluntary  restraint
agreements.  All  of these less formal trade actions  involve import harassment  and  import
protection.3  Second,  the increasing use of AD/CVD laws in major industrial countries is a
reflection of their advanced legal  systems and the sophistication  of their rent-seeking  producer
groups.  Third,  AD/CVDs have  typically been used to  impede  the exports  of developing
nations,  for example,  the US has brought fourteen separate  cases against  Colombia's  cut
flower industry (CBO  1994).  Fourth, there has been a substantial increase in the average duty
applied to  "unfair"  imports by the US.  Between  1980-1986,  the  average  duty was 21.6
percent, by 1987-1992 the average duty had increased to 47.2 percent (DeVault  1993).
The  evolution of US  AD/CVD  law has almost  eliminated  the use of the Section 201
Escape Clause.  There is little need for an industry to complain about fairly traded imports,
only to receive temporary protection, when the standard  of injury is lower for unfairly traded
imports.  Unfairness  can almost always be found and with a finding that imports are unfairly
traded, protection has historically been permanent.  Even the US Congressional Budget  Office
notes:  "Proving  dumping  or  subsidies  is  not  much of a  hurdle,  ...,  since Department  of
Commerce's procedures find dumping or subsidies in the vast majority of cases" (CBO  1994,
p.  51).  The stringency  of AD law has led  Canada's Minister for International  Trade,  Roy
MacLaren, to suggest the "necessity of considerably tightening the international discipline  on -
if not  the  outright  dismantling  - of antidumping  law."  The  weakness  of the  UR/AD
agreement  has led Schott to state "the agreement provides  a bandage to a festering sore of
trade policy"  (Schott  1994,  p. 85).
3It is generally accepted  that  bringing a AD/CVD case results in import harassment.  The
uncertainty surrounding the possibility of a trade action results in caution being exercised by
foreign  exporters,  especially  considering  the  cost  of defending  themselves,  even  when
successful.
196If AD/CVD laws are often used as a protective device, what are the economic principles
underlying  their  application?  AD laws were  originally  put  in  place  to prevent predatory
pricing.  Predatory pricing  is the practice of a firm selling products below cost to drive  out
rival firms, thereby creating a monopoly for itself and enabling  it to subsequently raise prices
above those that prevailed  before the predatory pricing began.  This form of firm behavior
stifles competition  and is welfare decreasing.  However,  there is  a general  consensus  that
successful predatory pricing is extremely rare.  Shin,  in her study of 282 AD cases,  could find
only  10  percent that were consistent  with dumping behavior.  Some might argue that this
behaviour  reflects the "new trade theory" but even Krugman argues that  such behaviour is
rare in the real world.  The probability of a firm creating  a monopoly in the production of an
agricultural good, unless it is government sanctioned through a domestic marketing board or
marketing order,  seems remote.  Whatever its original intent, AD laws are now used primarily
against international price discrimination,  selling in a foreign market for less than in the home
market.  Behavior which, if practiced by domestic firms in the domestic  market, is perfectly
legal.
The economic basis  for a CVD  complaint  is  different than for an AD  action.  An AD
action is brought by domestic producers against foreign firms who are alleged to be engaging
in unfair pricing practices.  A CVD case is brought by domestic producers  against foreign
governments.  As Horlick notes, there is "a grain of truth, which is the distortion caused by
subsidies"  lying  behind  the rationale  for a CVD,  while  AD  actions  are  "90  percent  pure
protectionist" (Horlick 1991,  p. 137).  Essentially,  domestic firms should not be expected to
compete against the treasuries of foreign governments,  or to use an overworked cliche the
"playing field should be level."4
The welfare effects of AD/CVD laws on the country  imposing these duties are familiar
to anyone who knows welfare economics.  Since the country imposing the AD/CVD is an
importer,  the duty acts like a tariff and it lowers the economic welfare of the country imposing
the duty.5  Welfare is lowered because expensive home country production or "fairly" traded
imports are substituted,  for "unfairly" traded ones.6  This is a "beggar your consumer"  policy.
It should be noted that from a welfare economics  perspective  it makes no difference if the
low prices result from the actions of foreign firms  or foreign governments.
The USITC, in a comprehensive analysis of the economic effects of  AD/CVD actions in
the US, calculated  a net welfare loss of $1.59 billion and job losses of 4,075  in the affected
sectors  (USITC  1995).  This  amounts  to  about  $39,000  per  worker  transferred  from
employment  in the affected  sector to  alternative  employment  elsewhere  in the  economy.7
4A former Commissioner of the USITC  once noted that countries should be concerned  less
about the tilt of the playing field and more about the quality of the team they put on the field.
5The exception is when the importing country is "large" and the duty approximates an optimal
tariff
6There is considerable evidence of trade diversion from unfairly to fairly traded imports as a
result of AD/CVD actions in the US (USITC  1995).
7The model employed by the USITC assumes full employment (USITC 1995).
197However,  these calculations  were  sufficiently troublesome to  have two of the  six USITC
commissioners vote against the release of the USITC  study.
Commissioner Newquist noted, "the estimates provided here  are not "facts"  or "findings"
in the usual sense of Commission 332 studies; instead they are theoretical, untested results
of certain modelling exercises undertaken by Commission economists  and should be viewed
with that understanding and limitation."
The dissenting  Commissioners,  as well  as two other  Commissioners  who had  serious
reservations  about the report,  seemed to base their negative  opinions on two  assumptions.
First, the results of the computable  general equilibrium  model used by the USITC  can not
capture the "localized"  negative effects on the affected industries.  Second,  a political decision
has been taken to discourage unfairly traded imports, regardless  of their benefits, if they cause
harm  to  competing  domestic  industries  and  workers.  These views  are  consistent  with
Corden's description of a conservative  welfare function and more flattering than Baldwin and
Steagall's assertion that "in recent years President's have tended to nominate, and  Senate to
confirm, individuals who do not apply strict injury or causation standards."
AD/CVD laws apply to manufactured and agricultural  products.  In practice,  contingency
protection laws are designed to deal primarily with "fix price"  markets rather than the "flex
price"  markets  that  generally  characterize  trade  in  agricultural  commodities.  This  has
implications  particularly  with  regard  to price  under-cutting.  Further,  the  UR  of trade
negotiations  continues the tradition of agricultural products being treated  differently within
the GATT/WTO than manufactured  products.
Whatever the merits of CVDs on welfare grounds they deal with questions with which
economists  are comfortable.  What are the effects of subsidies  or pricing  practices  on the
volume of trade,  production,  prices and industry welfare?  It is instructive to compare the
administrative procedures followed in CVD cases to what is taught in Economics  101.  The
time constraints national administered  protection agencies work under, and the requirement,
in  the US,  to  examine  an  exhaustive  set  of economic  indicators  often  means  that  these
agencies are attempting to apply basic economic  principles to complex real world  situations.
Seldom will national  administered protection agencies have the luxury  of estimating crucial
economic  parameters,  testing  theory  or  applying  the  latest  theoretical  or  econometric
techniques.
The WTO Agreement  on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures specifies  a three  step
process for determining if a country may legally impose  a countervailing  duty on the exports
of another country:
Standing:Are the complainants  representative  of  the domestic industry that  produces
the subject  product? In making this determination,  the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing  Measures  states that an application  can be considered  to have been
made on behalf of the domestic industry if it is supported  by domestic producers
whose collective output constitutes  more than 50 percent  of the total  production of the
198like-product. No investigation should be undertaken if  the petition is supported by
less than 25 percent of total like-product  production.
Subsidy: Does a domestic or export subsidy exist in a  foreign nation which influences
domestic imports?  The  WTO provides an illustrative list of export subsidies, a
definition of non-actionable  general (non-specific) subsidies, and a short list of non-
actionable specific subsidies.  The  WTO  also specifies a de  minimus level for
actionable subsidies of 1 percent ad valorem in  countervailing duty  cases. In
addition, the Agreement on Agriculture contains a number of exceptions which apply
to agriculture.
Iniury/Causality:  Is the complainant's  industry materially injured  or threatened  with
material  injury as a result of the subsidized imports and not by other  factors  which
could be harming the industry?  On this point, the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing  Measures is quite specific. It says that "it must be demonstrated  that
the subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury."  In
addition, "the demonstration  of a causal relationship  between the subsidized  imports
and the injury shall be based  on an examination of all relevant evidence before the
authorities - other factors (affecting the industry) should not be ascribed  to  the
imports.  "
The three step process used in evaluating the domestic effects of subsidized imports is
generally consistent with the principles of economic policy evaluation.  The rules on standing
are designed to reduce frivolous  complaints, although they are not sufficiently stringent to
keep Canada's single producer of padded,  perfumed ladies coat hangers from alleging injury
resulting from imports of foreign like-products.
The calculation of the level of the subsidy is more problematic,  but many of the subsidies
provided to agricultural producers are fairly transparent.  There will always be disagreements
about  specificity  and  measurement  techniques  but  the  existence  and  value  of particular
subsidies is less controversial than the injury determination.8
The WTO allows for countervailing  duties to offset foreign export subsidies or domestic
subsidies,  even though  export  subsidies  are  expressly prohibited  on manufactured  goods.
Export subsidies  on agricultural products are restricted  but not prohibited.
It is instructive to consider the trade effects of export subsidies as illustrated in Figure 1.
Panel (a)  in Figure  1 denotes the foreign country, panel (c) the home country and panel (b)
the excess  supply and excess demand curves whose intersection determines the free trade
world market price of Pw.  At this price the foreign country consumes DF, supplies S,  and the
home country supplies  SH and demands DH.  The world trade volume is E,  as illustrated in
panel (b).  The effect of a constant per unit export subsidy in the foreign country is to shift
8The WTO and US CVD law require that a subsidy be specific to an industry in order for it
to be countervailable.
199the excess supply function from ESF to ES'F.  This results in the price in the home country
declining from Pw to P'H and the price in the foreign country increasing from Pw to P'F. The
quantity  traded  increases  from E  to  E'.  Clearly,  home  producers  and  foreign  country
consumers  lose  as  a  result  of the  foreign  export  subsidy,  while  foreign  producers  and
domestic consumers  gain as a result of the export subsidy.  If a countervailing  duty equal to
P'F minus P  H  is levied on imports,  it  shifts the excess  supply curve  from ES'F  back to its
original position ESF.  In effect,  the countervailing duty exactly offsets the export subsidy so
the  free  trade equilibrium  price  Pw, and the  free trade  equilibrium  quantity traded  (E) is
restored.
PF  Pw  PH  Sys
ESF
0  IOFD)F  S  FS°  IISHS1JIDH  Q
Panel  a:  the foreign  Panel  b: excess  Panel c:  the home
country  upply and  demand  country
Figure 1.  Effects  of an export subsidy.
Continuous lines represent equilibrium before the subsidy.
Dashed lines represent equilibrium after the subsidy.
Consider now Figure 2, which illustrates the effects of either an input subsidy or an output
subsidy in the foreign country.  In panel  (a) the competitive supply curve  SF is  shifted to the
right to S'F.  as a result of  This results in the excess supply curve shifting from ESF to ES'F.
World  prices  decline  from Pw  to  Pw  in both the importing  and exporting  regions.  The
quantity traded increases from E to E'.  If the home country  imposes  a countervailing  duty
equal to the per unit subsidy in the foreign country the new  excess supply function  will be
shifted to the left of the competitive  excess supply function (ESF).  This results in a higher
world  market prices  and lower world trade volumes than in the free trade situation.  The
degree of the overestimation  depends on the elasticity of the excess supply and excess  demand
curves.  Only when the excess demand curve has an infinite elasticity would the countervailing
duty be calculated correctly.  However, in this case the foreign nation is a "small  country" and
its exports would have no effect on price in the home market.  Hence, a small country can not
cause  material injury.  The WTO rules clearly  anticipate this potential situation when they
discuss  remedies for domestic subsidies.
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Figure 2.  Effects  of a domestic  subsidy.
Continuous lines represent  equilibrium before the subsidy.
Dashed lines represent equilibrium after the subsidy.
Bold lines represent equilibrium after the subsidy and a counterveiling  duty.
Remedy:  If  an investigation uncovers subsidies above the de minimus  level and
material  injury has occurred, the WTO allows a countervailing  duty to be applied to
the subsidized  imports.  The WTO allows the countervailing  duty to be up to the level
of  the measured  subsidy.  The Agreement on Subsidies Countervailing  Measures says
that "it is desirable that the duty should be less than the total amount of the subsidy
if  such lesser duty would be adequate to remove injury to the domestic industry."
While  calculating the proper level for the  countervailing  duty  in the case of a
domestic subsidy is more complicated than in the case of an export subsidy, because
it relies  on economic parameters  (supply and  demand elasticities), these parameters
are often needed to determine injury.  Hence, this information could be used in
selecting a more proper  remedy.9
In addition to the WTO rules and the simple analytics  discussed  above,  there are  several
key decisions that must be taken  in every countervailing  duty investigation that influence  the
potential for an adverse ruling.  These decisions  are a part of the standing  determination but
go well beyond the legal issue of who has the right to bring  a case.
Article  11.4 of the Agreement on  Subsidies and Countervailing  Measures  says domestic
producers  have the legal right to bring a countervailing  duty case if they produce  a product
9This discussion assumes that the proper role of a CVD is to restore the competitive  solution.
An  alternative  explanation  is  that  the  CVD  is  simply  the  agreed  upon  penalty  for  a
government  which  subsidizes  production  and,  as  such,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the
competitive  solution.  Under this viewpoint  subsidizing  countries have agreed to be over-
penalized for their activities.
201"like"  the one subsidized  by the foreign government.  The term "like-product"  is not well
defined leaving this decision largely up to the complainant and national  authorities to decide.
In general, the complainant  will have an incentive to reduce the size of the allegedly injured
domestic industry.  In this way, the effects of the subsidized  imports are more concentrated
making it easier to find injury.  An example,  cited by the Congressional Budget Office relates
to the CVD cases  against cut flowers.  When the industry was defined  as  cut flowers as  a
whole, or for broad segments of the flower industry,  the USITC usually found no injury, but
when the industry was defined for specific flowers injury was found.
A second key decision relates to the issue of whether the foreign  subsidized product is
similar to, or identical to, the domestic product.  Economists tackle this question through the
use of elasticities of substitution in final consumption for a consumption good, or production
for  an  input.  An  infinite elasticity  of substitution  implies  homogeneous  goods,  while  an
elasticity  of substitution  greater  than  zero  but  less  than  infinity  signifies  differentiated
products.  An elasticity of substitution equal to zero shows that the goods are used in fixed
proportions.  In general, the complainant will argue that the imported goods are identical to
the domestic good, while the defendant will argue that the imported product is differentiated.
If no injury is found using the homogeneous good assumption, it seems unlikely that injury
could be proven if  the goods are considered differentiated  products.  However,  injury might
be found for homogenous goods but not for differentiated products,  hence the importance  of
the decision.
Finally,  some agrifood products are traded in more than one form and at multiple levels
of the market.  The use of an agrifood product as an input  in another product raises the issue
of "upstream" subsidies.  An upstream subsidy investigation requires two steps.  The first step
is to document the government programs that provide subsidies and to determine  at which
market level they most logically apply.  The second  step is to analyze the potential for the
subsidies to injure the domestic  industries at both market  levels.  An example  will help to
illustrate the point.
Suppose  a  price  support  scheme  for  raw  product  producers  in  country  1  results  in
increased production of the raw product in that country,  and a lower market price for the raw
product  in both  countries.  In  this  case,  subsidies  in  country  1 injure  the  raw  product
producers in country  2, but the raw product  subsidy does not injure the processing  sector in
country 2.  The processing sectors in both countries gain access to a lower priced input and
both sell their output for the same price.  Therefore, the processing sectors in both countries
benefit while raw product producers in country 2 are injured and raw product producers  in
country  1 benefit.
Now  suppose that country  1 provides an energy subsidy to its processors.  Lower fuel
costs  allow processors in country  1 to bid up the price of other inputs  including the raw
product.  This  causes  injury  to  country  2's processing  sector  and  benefits  raw product
producers in both countries.  Finally, suppose country  1 offers a subsidy on every unit of raw
product purchased from domestic  sources.  In the long run, this scheme increases the supply
of the  raw product  in country  1 and  the  raw  product  price  in both  countries  declines.
Therefore, raw product producers and processors in country 2 would be injured.  The variety
202of possible scenarios  suggests that it is crucial to evaluate the potential effects of the existing
subsidies on the various market participants before defining the domestic industry.
While the economic analysis of various stylized  subsidy schemes is straight forward, "real
world" CVD cases  are  messy.  Seldom  will the facts fit  neatly into  a textbook  example.
Consequently,  the issues and economic analysis conducted in four recent trade disputes  are
reviewed.  Two  CVD  cases  brought  by the  US  against  Canada  (softwood  lumber  and
hogs/pork), one Section 22 investigation against Canada (durum wheat),  and one CVD action
brought by Canada against the US (corn).
The purpose of these reviews  is not to provide the definitive economic  analysis of each
case.  Instead the cases are used to illustrate the range of issues which must be addressed and
the types of economic analysis undertaken.
Case  Studies
CASE 1: The US CVD Case Against Canadian  Softwood Lumber
In  1991,  Canada exported  about 70 percent of its softwood lumber production  and  77
percent  of the  exports were to  the US  Canada is  essentially the  sole  foreign supplier  of
softwood lumber in the US market.  The bilateral  softwood lumber trade was worth $2.82
billion (USITC  1992) in  1991.  However,  despite its  size, or perhaps  because  of its size,
softwood lumber has been at the centre of a lengthy and heated trade dispute.
The market share of Canadian softwood lumber in the US rose from 17  percent in 1975
to 33  percent  in  1985  (Doran and Nostali  1987)  and has  since stabilized  at 29 percent  (in
value terms).  The increasing market share of imported Canadian softwood lumber during the
early 1980s created concern among US lumber producers.  In October 1982,  the US  Coalition
for  Fair  Canadian  Lumber  Imports (a group  of eight  trade  associations  and  350 lumber
producing  firms)  filed  a formal  CVD  complaint  against  softwood  lumber  imported from
Canada.  The Coalition alleged that Canadian  federal and provincial governments subsidized
Canadian forest products through a number of programs and practices.  In November  1982,
the USITC found, in a preliminary ruling, that the US lumber industry had been materially
injured by allegedly subsidized softwood lumber imported from Canada.  However, in May
1983,  the International Trade Administration  [ITA] of the Department of Commerce came
up with a negative subsidy determination which terminated the case.  The ITA argued that the
benefits provided through Canada's provincial stumpage programs were not export  subsidies
and the domestic program benefits were "generally available" to all forest products.10  Since
1oStumpage programs in Canada are operated by the Ministry of  Natural Resources in each
province.  Individuals and companies  acquire the right to cut and  remove standing timber
from Crown lands. The individuals and companies also assume the responsibility to regenerate
the forest they harvest up to the stage of "free to grow."  The royalty/price/rent  paid to the
provincial government for the standing timber is known as stumpage.
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construed as domestic  subsidies under US countervailing duty law.
While the  negative  determination  by the  ITA was  discouraging  to  US  interests,  the
Coalition did not give up.  In May of 1986,  after the market share  of imported  softwood
lumber from Canada had risen to 33  percent, the Coalition filed a second  countervailing  duty
petition.  The  Coalition  alleged that  the provincial  governments  in  Canada  sold  standing
timber at "below market value" prices which amounted to an "upstream"  subsidy to Canadian
softwood lumber producers.  The Coalition argued that the growing market share captured
by Canadian softwood lumber was a reflection of this subsidy  and that these imports were
causing material injury to the US lumber industry.  In July  1986, the USITCs preliminary
investigation found that the US softwood lumber industry was materially injured because of
allegedly subsidized softwood lumber imports from Canada.  In October  1986, the ITA in its
preliminary determination ruled that softwood lumber imported from Canada was subsidized
through  administratively set stumpage prices and through the provision of public resources
(eg. expenses for forest regeneration  and construction of logging roads) to lumber producers.
The subsidy was calculated to equal  15 percent  ad valorem.
The  Trade and  Tariff Act of 1984  may have  contributed  to the reversal  of the  ITA's
decision  about  softwood  lumber  imports  from Canada.  Two  provisions  of this  act  are
particularly  notable.  First, the Act provided  a reinterpretation of the statute which allowed
the  ITA  to  find  a  product to  be  subsidized  if the  subject  product  was  produced  from
subsidized inputs (CBO 1994, p. 28).  Second, the Act required all agencies  administering US
trade  laws  to give technical  assistance to US firms  on how to make  successful AD/CVD
petitions (CBO  1994, p. 28).  The assistance provided by US government  agencies  may have
helped the US lumber coalition to redesign its complaint to be more consistent with a positive
subsidy  determination.  The fact that the market share of Canadian  softwood lumber in the
US was growing at a faster rate between  1983 and  1986 than in the past (Doran and Nostali
1987) also contributed to the decision reversal.  Following the preliminary  determination  of
subsidy by the ITA, the USITC ruled  that the subsidized  softwood lumber imported from
Canada  caused "material  injury" to the US lumber industry and immediately imposed  a  15
percent CVD on all softwood lumber imported from Canada.
The final determination of the value of the CVD was to be announced by December  30,
1986.  However, the CVD case was terminated when the governments of Canada and the US
negotiated a Memorandum  of Understanding [MOU]  on softwood lumber.  Under the MOU,
the government  of Canada  agreed to impose  a 15  percent export tax on certain  softwood
lumber exports bound for the US market.  The export tax could be reduced or eliminated with
30 days notice, if provincial governments adjusted their stumpage  fees upward and charged
an appropriate  fee for forest regeneration.  The MOU took effect  on January 8, 1987 and
influenced Canada-US  lumber trade for almost five years.
On September 3, 1991 the government of Canada unilaterally announced that provincial
stumpage  charges had increased to the extent that it was no longer necessary to collect the
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of Commerce would be self-initiating a CVD case involving softwood lumber imports from
Canada.  The US government also imposed temporary import duties ranging up to 15 percent
on softwood lumber imported from certain provinces of Canada.  This duty was imposed  as
a  contingency  protection  measure  while  the  investigations  for  final  subsidy  and  injury
determination were undertaken.
In May 1992 the ITA reported the results of it's final  subsidy determination.  The ITA
identified two domestic subsidies:  provincial stumpage programs and log export restrictions
in British Columbia.  These two subsidies,  according to the ITA, equalled  a subsidy margin
of 6.51  percent  (2.9  percent  for  stumpage  and  3.6  percent  for  provincial  log  export
restrictions  in  British  Columbia).  Based  on  this  ruling,  the  USITC  started  its  final
investigation for determining material injury.  In July  1992 it ruled that subsidized softwood
lumber  imported  from  Canada  caused  material  injury  to  lumber  producers  in  the  US
Accordingly,  a 6.51  percent  ad valorem duty went into effect  on May 28,  1992.
Although the magnitude of the final tariff was less that one-half of its initial value,  the
government  of Canada appealed the ITA and USITC decisions to a binational panel under
Article  1904  of the  Canada-US  Free  Trade  Agreement  [FTA].  On  July  26,  1993  the
Binational Panel remanded the ITA and USITC decisions. In particular, the Panel asked the
Department of Commerce to recalculate the softwood lumber dumping margin.  The Panel
found that the record did not support the finding that Canadian softwood lumber imports had
a significant price-suppressing  effect on the US softwood lumber market.  It noted that the
cross-sectoral  comparison  used  by  the  USITC  to  support  its  positive  determination  of
material injury was "seriously flawed."  As a consequence,  the Panel asked  the USITC to
provide additional statistical evidence to support its determination of material injury.  Both
the ITA and USITC responded to the request.  The ITA revised  its softwood lumber subsidy
estimate to 11.54 percent, almost double its earlier estimate.  The USITC also reaffirmed  its
original  determination  of material  injury  to the US  softwood  lumber industry  caused  by
subsidized  softwood lumber imports from Canada.  After reviewing the responses from the
ITA and  the USITC,  the Binational Panel  ruled that the analysis  of the  determination  of
subsidy was flawed and that the USITC's determination of material injury to the US lumber
industry was not based on sound  statistical evidence.  As  a result, the Panel  dismissed the
CVD case against Canadian softwood lumber on January 28,  1994.
While the case is complex, the softwood lumber dispute deals with the standard  questions
asked in every CVD investigation.  Is Canadian lumber production subsidized?  Do imports
of allegedly subsidized  softwood lumber cause material injury to the lumber industry in the
US?
"The  MOU was terminated on October 4,  1991.
205In a competitive industry,  which seems to characterize the US-Canada  softwood lumber
market, price is determined by the intersection of supply and demand. 1 2  The supply curve is
the marginal cost function, but the supply of timber depends on a renewable natural resource,
primarily second-growth  forests.  Given the soil and climatic conditions in Canada,  a typical
planting-harvest  cycle takes from 60 to 120 years to complete.  Thus, the current  stock of
timber is largely fixed.  This is true even under the new forest management  regime which
allows large companies to lease crown land for 10-20 years for harvesting  and regeneration.
The  countervailing  duty  statute  in  the  US  requires  the  USITC  to  determine  if the
softwood lumber industry in the US is materially injured by reason of subsidized imports from
Canada.  Explicit in this statute is a requirement that the domestic  and foreign products are
"like products."  Many people in the softwood lumber industry, both in the US and in Canada,
believe that the assumption  of like products may not be appropriate  for  softwood lumber
produced  in  Canada  (Spruce-Pine-Fur  type)  and  softwood  lumber  produced  in  the  US
(Southern Yellow Pine).  Most of the softwood lumber imported from Canada is considered
of  better quality because of its straightness,  strength and superior nail holding ability (Wallace
1987,  p.37).  In many  end  uses,  particularly  in house  building,  softwood  imported  from
Canada  is  used  for  inside  framing.  The  southern  yellow  pine  has  the  characteristic  of
absorbing chemicals (USITC  1992, pp. A-72-A-75).  Consequently,  southern yellow pine is
used  in building  patio  decks,  side  walls  etc.  At  least  in  this end  use,  softwood  lumber
imported from Canada and softwood lumber produced in the US are complements rather than
substitutes.  The argument that the two types of softwood are complements  is consistent with
econometric  evidence that finds a positive coefficient  for the US lumber price  variable in
simple Canadian-US  lumber trade models (Buongiorno et al.  1988;  Sarker  1993).  If Canadian
and US softwood lumber are complements,  Canadian shipments cannot cause material injury.
The  ITA found  two  countervailable  practices  in Canada  in  its  final  determination  1]
provincial  stumpage  programs,  and  2]  log  export  restrictions  in the  province  of British
Columbia.  In calculating the subsidy implicit in the stumpage  programs, the ITA compared
the price of stumpage for softwood with the stumpage price for other types of timber.  The
benchmark price for Alberta and Ontario was the price of pulp logs; for British Columbia, the
competitively-bid  price  for  softwood;  and  for  Quebec,  the  price  for  private  softwood
stumpage.  The production processes  of pulp and softwood  lumber both use timber as an
input but they result in two different  outputs.  The demand and  supply conditions for wood
pulp and soft wood are quite different.  Since the stumpage  fee is determined  as a residual
value, the differences in output prices and the differences in operating expenses contribute to
differences  in  stumpage  rates.  Hence,  it  is  not  clear  how  the  differences  in  these  two
stumpage  rates  could  be used to calculate  an appropriate  subsidy  margin.  Nevertheless,
program benefits per unit of shipment for each of the four provinces were calculated and then
12According to the USITC (1982),  there were 8,367 establishments  in the US and Canada
involved in producing softwood and hardwood lumber during 1980.  The concentration ratio
in  this  industry  is  also  modest.  The  five  largest  companies  account  for  30  percent  of
production in the US and only 22 percent of production in Canada.  These figures suggest
that a competitive  market model applies to the North American softwood lumber industry.
206the export shares of each province were used as weights  to calculate the average country-
wide subsidy margin.
In calculating the subsidy equivalent of the British Columbia log export restriction, the
ITA argued  that the export ban was an indirect  domestic  subsidy  to the  primary lumber
producing  industry.  The log export restrictions  in British Columbia, which  also  prohibits
shipments to other provinces, could  depress local log prices and give an advantage to local
processors/companies  in terms of higher rents.  However, the log export restrictions  have
been in  place since  1906  and  it  is unclear why  such long  standing  restrictions  have  only
recently become problematic.
The way in which stumpage fees are determined  and the fact that the supply of timber is
fixed  are essential  components in understanding  the  economics  of this  case.  In Canada,
stumpage  fees are  set  administratively  using a "residual"  approach.  The  stumpage  fee is
calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  output  price  and  operating  costs  per  unit.
Essentially,  the authorities use a cost of production procedure, where working backwards
from the  lumber  price  and  subtracting  transportation,  processing  and  logging  costs  the
"value" of standing timber is determined.  This value is a rent and not profit.  Competitive
profit  is built  into  the  firm's  operating  costs.  Under  the  formula  pricing  system,  actual
stumpage  fees may  deviate from competitive  stumpage  charges  due to weak competition
(constrained  entry due to high initial capital investment)  or overestimation of sawmills'  costs.
The question is: what is the supply effect of such underpricing?  The answer is zero. Why?
Since stumpage  is an economic  rent, its over- or under-collection  by a resource  owner
does not alter supply decisions unless it is so high it causes firms to shut-down.  Ricardo (pp.
38-39) made this point when he noted,
"[The price of]  Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because corn
is high; it has been justly observed that no reduction would take place in the price of
corn although landlord  should forego the whole of their rent.  Such a measure would
only enable some farmers to live like a gentlemen, but would not diminish the quantity
of labour necessary to raise raw produce on the least productive land in cultivation."
Therefore, the stumpage  fees charged in Canada cannot have any price depressing  effect in
the US market, unless they influence the supply of lumber! 13
CASE 2: The  US CVD Case Against Canadian  Hogs and  Pork
Canada has a long history of providing price and income support to farmers.  Although
agriculture  in Canada  is a shared responsibility of federal  and provincial  governments, the
federal government was largely responsible for providing income stabilization programs until
the early 1970s (Meilke and Warley  1990).  Following this time period, a number of provinces
1 3A colleague  suggests there  is  a negative correlation  between  current allowable  cut  and
stumpage fees.  This is a point worthy of further investigation.
207introduced farm income support programs which reflected  province-specific  desires.  Among
these were  programs to  support  the incomes  of red  meat  producers.  By the  mid-1980s
competitive  subsidization  of red meat producers,  across  provinces was  a well  recognized
problem.  An amended National  Tripartite Stabilization Plan [NTSP], which provided floor
prices to hog producers and imposed negotiated  ceilings on the support provided to the red
meat sector, appeared to be a solution to the problem (Meilke  1991).14  While the formation
of the NTSP helped to bring diverse provincial  hog stabilization programs under one set of
rules,  in retrospect,  it may have made hog stabilization payments  an easier target for CVD
action by the US.
However,  the hog/pork trade dispute preceded the establishment  of the NTSP, and like
softwood lumber the dispute has stretched over more than a decade.  In November  1984 the
United States National Pork Producers Council along with a number of meat packers in the
US  filed a CVD petition with the Department  of Commerce  and USITC  against hogs  and
pork imported from Canada.  After the preliminary investigation the ITA identified twenty-
four federal  and provincial  programs  providing countervailable  subsidies to hog  and pork
producers in Canada.  The calculated  subsidy was $0.0439 per pound of live weight.  The
ITA considered hogs and pork to be members of the same industry and, based on its subsidy
determination,  the US imposed preliminary  duties equal to the subsidy margin on both hogs
and pork imported from Canada.
In  its  preliminary  investigation  of material  injury,  the  USITC  overturned  the  ITA's
preliminary decision that hogs and pork were members of the same industry and treated hogs
and pork as separate industries.  Based on its preliminary investigation,  the ITC found that
hog producers in the US were materially injured by hog imports from Canada, but that there
was no evidence of material injury or threat of material injury to the US pork sector.  The
positive injury decision on hogs and the negative injury decision on pork began a long series
of appeals  and remands.  A chronology  and discussion  of the various judicial  decisions  is
beyond the scope of this paper (Meilke and van Duren 1990; Meilke and Moschini  1992;
Veeman  1994; Ludwick  1994).  Suffice it to say, appeals have been heard by the US Court
of  International  Trade,  at  least  two  binational  panels  formed  under  the  FTA,  two
extraordinary challenge  committees under the FTA and by the GATT.  The result has been
the continuous application of countervailing  duties on Canada's exports of live hogs to the
US, with no permanent application of duties against imports of Canadian pork.  There have
been temporary duties applied to pork imports during various  stages of the dispute.
Given the length of  the hogs and pork dispute and the multitude of legal actions it is easy
to lose sight of the basic economics of the case.  However,  there are four facts on which both
sides agree.  First, the dispute involves domestic production subsidies, export subsidies were
never  an issue.  Second,  both  hogs and  pork are  priced  in competitive  North  American
markets.  Third, with the exception of technical regulations involving Canada's importing of
hogs, no significant trade barriers inhibit trade between Canada and the US in either the hog
1 4Tripartite because it is funded jointly by producers and both levels of government.
208or pork markets.  Fourth, of the domestic production subsidies  identified by US authorities,
almost all were paid to hog, not pork producers.
Given these facts  there are three  key questions  that need to be answered  in this trade
dispute.
*  Subsidy:  Is hog and pork production in Canada subsidized?
*  Injury:  If  Canadian  hog  and  pork  production  is  subsidized  do  these  subsidies
materially injure US hog and pork producers?
*  Remedy:  If  hog  and  pork producers  in  the US  are  injured  as  a  result of Canada's
domestic production subsidies, what is the appropriate  remedy?
On  the  subsidy  question  the  issue  hinges  on the  "specificity"  of Canada's  domestic
production  subsidies.  The  Department  of Commerce  ruled  that the production  subsidies
given to  Canadian hog producers through various federal  and provincial programs  are not
generally available to all producers in agriculture and hence,  can be considered  specific to the
hog  sector.  Canada  argued  that while  the  NTSP  applied  to  only  a  limited  number  of
commodities, nearly all other Canadian agricultural commodities  were covered by  some form
of stabilization plan.  At least one binational panel agreed  with the Canadian  point of view,
but from an economic perspective it seems clear that the type of deficiency payment program
used in the hog sector does have the potential to increase the output of hogs.  More will be
said about this when considering injury.
The  Department of Commerce  ruled the production  subsidies  given to Canadian  hog
producers were equivalent to subsidies being given to pork producers.  On this point they
were  clearly  wrong.  Both Canadian  and US pork producers  benefit  from  Canadian hog
production subsidies if they lower the market price for their major input.  Packers  in both
countries buy hogs on the open market and sell pork on the open market.  The production
subsidies in Canada,  assuming perfect arbitrage  and that Canada remains an exporter of both
hogs and pork, provide no competitive  advantage  to pork producers located in Canada.
On the question of injury the economics are simple.  First,  have Canadian hog production
subsidies increased Canadian hog production and exports?  Most of the available  econometric
estimates on this issue would suggest the answer is either not at all or to a very limited extent
(Martin  and  Goddard  1987).  Second,  has the  increase  in  Canadian  hog  production  and
exports caused by the production subsidies,  reduced the US hog price to such an extent  as
to cause material injury to US hog producers?  Again, the available  economic analysis would
suggest the answer is no (Moschini and Meilke  1992; Meilke and Scally  1988).  In essence,
a  proper  economic  analysis  must trace  the  causal  effect  from the  domestic  production
subsidies through to the increase, if any, in Canadian exports of hogs and pork to the US, and
then to the price impact in the US market.  Injury, if  it has occurred, results from the marginal
increase in Canadian production  and exports resulting from the production subsidies - not
from the entire quantity of hog exports into the US  market.  To argue otherwise implies that
Canadian hog exports would be zero in the absence of the production subsidies, a conclusion
which has no support either in theory or in reality.
209The USITC  in some of their economic  analyses  appeared to accept  this  argument but
applied  it in a flawed  manner.  To analyze the effects of Canadian  hog and pork exports  on
the US market, the USITC estimated  injury to US hog producers  by:  1]  calculating the ratio
of Canadian  hog marketings to total North American  hog marketings;  2]  determining  the
change in this ratio from year to year; and 3] using the change in this ratio to determine the
impact  of Canadian  production  subsidies  on  US  hog  prices.  Sensitivity  analysis  was
conducted  using a range  (-1.0 to -2.0) of domestic  demand flexibilities.  The USITC logic
seems  to  suggest  that  any  increase  in  Canada's  North  American  market  share  of hog
production  results  from its  domestic  hog  subsidies.  Interestingly,  it  also  suggests  that  a
decline in Canada's North American market share is also a result of Canadian hog production
subsidies!  In fact,  in one year of the USITC's analyses Canada's  market share did decline.
It  is  difficult  to  see  how Canada's  hog  production  subsidies  provided  a  competitive
disadvantage  or materially  injured US packers.  However, based on simple correlations  and
trend analysis,  this was the USITCs conclusion.  Both a GATT  panel and a FTA binational
panel agreed  with the  Canadian position that the US would have to conduct  an upstream
subsidy investigation.  An upstream subsidy investigation  would require the US to show that
Canada's  hog  production  subsidies  provided  a  competitive  benefit  to  Canadian  pork
producers and materially injured US packers.  It was incorrect to assume that 100 percent of
the subsidies provided to swine producers were passed through to pork producers without
establishing factually what proportion of the subsidy, if any, was passed through.
While the USITC was wrong to assume that the full impact of hog production subsidies
applied to the pork production sector,  the vertically  linked nature of this market is important
in  determining  the  proper  remedy  for  a  domestic  production  subsidy.  While  Canada's
domestic production subsidies provide no competitive advantage to Canadian pork producers,
a CVD applied  only to hog production does.  A CVD on hogs lowers Canada's hog prices
below the free trade equilibrium price thus providing considerable  effective protection to the
Canadian  pork producing industry.  Moschini  and Meilke  show that an upstream  subsidy
investigation  is required to determine the pass through of hog production  subsidies to the
pork sector.  Using  a vertically  integrated  trade model,  Moschini  and  Meilke  derive  the
analytical expressions  for the proper CVDs for hogs and pork.  The proper CVD depends on
whether the objective of the complainant  country is to protect the interests of hog producers
only, or to protect the interests of both hog and pork producers.  The  CVDs in either case
depend  on the elasticities  of supply  and  demand for hogs  and pork. If the objective  is to
protect  the  interests  of both  hog  and  pork  producers,  CVDs  must be  imposed  on both
products.  However,  the level of the CVD  should be less than the subsidy margin  in both
cases  and the CVD on pork  should be less than that on hogs.
210CASE 3: The  US Section 22 Case Against Durum Wheat  from Canada
Prior to the signing  of the FTA,  only  a trickle of wheat  crossed  the  border between
Canada  and the US Canada had a restrictive import licensing system for wheat, and the US
imposed  a tariff of $0.21  per bushel.  However,  both countries  agreed  on a  formula to
eliminate  these trade barriers  during the FTA negotiations  and  on May  9,  1991  Canada
removed  its  import  licensing  system.  Although  the  US  is  the world's  dominant  wheat
exporter,  it  has  recently  become  an  important  destination  for  Canadian  wheat.  This  is
particularly true for premium quality durum wheat produced in Western Canada.  Since  1989,
Canadian wheat exports to the US have increased steadily,  rising to over two  million metric
tonnes  in  1993/94.  While  these  shipments  were  only  3 percent  of the total  US  wheat
availability,  in  1993/94  wheat imports from Canada  became  a hot  political  issue  (Loyns,
Knutson  and Meilke  1995).  In fact,  political  bickering  and  manouvering  to  protect the
interests of durum wheat producers in the US began almost immediately after the FTA was
ratified.
Initially,  durum wheat producers in North Dakota  complained that the freight  subsidy
given to Canadian durum producers under the Western Grain Transportation Act [WGTA]
constituted an export subsidy and hence, violated Article 701.2 of the FTA. 5  The US  Trade
Representative  investigated this complaint and determined that the wheat  shipped to the US
did not receive the freight  subsidy, and that any specific transportation  subsidy was generally
available to  all grain  shipments from Western  Canada to Thunder  Bay.16  Consequently,
Canada did not violate the FTA.  After this determination, the US Congress,  which was under
pressure from the wheat producers lobby, requested the USITC to examine the "conditions
of competition" between the US and Canadian durum industries.  In response to this request,
the USITC initiated a 332 investigation  and submitted  its final report  in June  1990.  The
USITC stated in its report that:
"it is not apparent from the data collected by the Commission in this investigation that
prices paid by US  Millers for Canadian  durum are  significantly different than prices
paid for US  durum. [USITC 1990, p.  ix]..... For like quantities of wheat, US prices
and Canadian prices fluctuate, with no  consistent price difference between  US and
Canadian durum that explains the growth of durum imports from Canada between
1986 and 1989  [USITC  1990, p.  7-1]."
The USITC concluded that the durum industries in the US and Canada  are competitive
and  that the  drought of 1987-89  was the main  reason for the increased  Canadian  durum
shipments into the US  However,  this did not bury the issue.  Relentless lobbying by durum
'5Article 701.2 of the FTA states that:  "Neither party shall introduce or maintain any export
subsidy  on  any  agricultural  goods  originating  in, or  shipped  from,  its territory  that  are
exported directly or indirectly to the territory of the other party."
16Small quantities of wheat destined for the US have been shipped through Thunder Bay in
order to be eligible for transportation  subsidies to that point.  The WGTA transportation
subsidy was eliminated on August  1, 1995.
211producers  resulted in the US government  bringing a trade action  against  Canadian durum
imports  under Chapter  18  of the  FTA.  The US  government  argued  that the  CWB  had
violated Article 701.3 of the FTA by selling wheat in the US below acquisition cost (including
storage,  handling and freight).  Article 701.3  of the FTA prohibits either of the signatories
from  exporting  agricultural  commodities  to  the other  country  at less  than its  acquisition
price. 1 7
The Binational Panel made its final ruling in favour of Canada in January  1993.  The panel
could find no compelling evidence that the CWB was selling durum wheat in the US market
at prices lower than its acquisition costs.
A number of weather related and political  events have contributed  to the  most recent
round of the wheat trade dispute.  Adverse weather conditions in the US during the Summer
of 1993/94 resulted in higher demand for Canadian wheat in the US market.  Due to flooding
in the Midwest, an increased quantity of Canadian wheat was trucked to elevators in Montana
and North Dakota.  This made the trade more visible  and the timing could not have been
better for US wheat producers,  because President Clinton was desperate for votes to gain
Congressional  approval  of the North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  [NAFTA].  As  a
consequence,  some members of Congress,  particularly those from the Northern Plain States,
told the President  that their  support  for the NAFTA hinged  on  his taking  action  against
imports of Canadian wheat.'8  After a successful NAFTA vote, President  Clinton directed the
USITC  to initiate  an investigation  under  Section  22  of the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act
[AAA] to determine whether wheat, wheat flour and semolina  imported into the US from
Canada was taking place "under such conditions or in such quantities  as to render or tend to
render  ineffective,  or materially interfere  with, the price support,  payment  and production
adjustment program conducted by the Department of Agriculture for wheat" (USITC  1994,
p. A-3).
A Section 22 investigation differs  from a CVD investigation because there is no need for
the  US  to  demonstrate  that  foreign  exports  are  subsidized,  or  that they  are  injuring US
producers.  It is  sufficient  to  show that the  imports  are  interfering  with US  agricultural
support  programs.  As  directed  by the  President,  the USITC  started  its investigation  on
January 18,  1994.  The final report of this investigation was forwarded,  along with a number
of recommendations,  to  the  President  on  June  15,  1994.  The  USITC  determined  that
Canadian wheat, wheat flour, and semolina were not being imported under such conditions
and in such quantities  as to render, or tend to render, ineffective the USDA wheat program.
While the  determination  was  generally  negative,  the USITC  provided  the President  with
'TArticle  701.3  states that:  "Neither party, including any public entity that it establishes  or
maintains, shall sell agricultural goods for export to the territory of the other party at a price
below the acquisition price of the goods plus any storage, handling or other costs incurred by
it with respect to those goods."
1 8Destler describes the horse trading that takes place in developing US trade policy.  See also
Orden for a specific discussion of agriculture and NAFTA.
212recommended  levels of import restrictions  should the President  determine  (contrary to its
findings) that there was evidence of material interference (USITC  1994b, pp. b-1  - b-18).
On August  1, 1994, the wheat trade dispute came to an  end as a result of a negotiated
settlement.  Canada agreed  to limit wheat  exports to the US while the US agreed  not to
pursue  an Article  XXVIII  action under the GATT to restrict wheat  imports.  Under this
agreement,  tariff rate quotas were used to restrict US imports of wheat  from the Canadian
Wheat Board [CWB]. 19  The voluntary export restraint agreement was written for one year
and  expired  in  September  1995  (Alston  et  al.  1994).  A  binational  commission  of
nongovernmental  experts was appointed to examine all aspects of the Canadian and the US
grain marketing and support systems. During the Commission's investigation,  the US agreed
to place no restrictions on Canadian wheat shipments  and Canada agreed not to take action
against the US  on wheat under the WTO  or NAFTA.  The Commission's  mandate was to
"assist the two governments in reaching long-term solutions to existing problems in the grain
sector"  (Canada-US  Joint  Commission  on  Grains,  p.  1).  The Commission's  preliminary
report was delivered in June  1995 and its recommendations met with a largely hostile reaction
in Canada.  The Commission's recommendations  are not binding  on either country and the
wheat dispute seems to be off the front of the political burner for at least three reasons:  1] the
US gave up its Section 22 wavier in the UR of trade negotiations;  2] the US has reduced its
use of export subsidies;  and 3] international wheat prices have increased  significantly.
Nonetheless  the economic  analysis used by the USITC to investigate the  durum wheat
dispute is interesting and illustrates its role in trade disputes not involving ADs or CVDs.  In
addition,  this case  is one of the few times the USITC  has used  an estimated  econometric
model to examine historical  evidence of causal relationships  embodied in data.  Perhaps,  the
Commission had little choice.  The evidence presented in the USITC hearings was based on
a wide variety of formal and informal economic  models.  On behalf of the CWB,  Sumner,
Alston and  Gray  [SAG]  presented  results from an econometric  model which was used to
examine  the  effects of Canadian wheat imports  on the US wheat  market.  SAGs  analysis
included  an extensive  discussion of the assumptions and parameters underlying the model.
The Law  and  Economics  Consulting  Group  made  a  submission  on behalf of US  wheat
producers arguing that imported Canadian wheat was underpriced  in the US market because
its quality is understated.  The USDA argued, based on expert  opinion, that wheat imports
from Canada increased wheat  supplies in the US,  and lowered  domestic wheat prices.  The
lower price then resulted in higher deficiency payments  and higher program  costs.  Hence, it
argued, Canadian wheat imports interfered with domestic price and income support programs
under  Section  22  of the US  AAA of 1933  (amended).  Abel,  Daft and Earley  presented
economic  analysis  on  behalf  of the  Millers  National  Federation,  the  National  Pasta
Association, and the National Grain Trade Council arguing that imports of Canadian wheat
1For durum wheat the tariff rates were as follows: $3 per ton for the first 300 kt; $23  per ton
for the next 150 kt and $50 per ton for imports above 450 kt.  For "other" wheat from the
CWB, the tariff rate was $3 per ton for the first 1.05  million tons and a tariff rate of $50 per
ton for imports above that limit.  There were no restrictions  on wheat flour, semolina or
Canadian soft red winter wheat imported from outside the CWB area.
213increased because  of lower wheat production in the US,  attributable to weather and USDA
farm  policies.  After  reviewing  all  these  arguments,  models,  and  results,  the USITC  staff
concluded that the results of any quantitative analysis depend on assumed  supply and demand
elasticities and that the more elastic the relevant response functions, the lower the impacts on
US prices and program costs.
It is important to keep the legal issue clearly in mind.  How large is the effect of Canadian
wheat exports on US wheat prices and on the cost of US government support programs?  The
direction  of effect  is  obvious,  only the size  of the effect  is  at  issue.  The  import-induced
program costs estimated by the USDA were $230.4 million ($0.12  per bushel), while  SAG
estimated the costs to be  $25.9 million  ($0.014 per bushel)  and the USITC (1994)  $73.2
million ($0.038  per bushel),  all for  1993/94.  The USITC investigated this issue using the
Vector  Autoregression  [VAR]  methodology  popularized  by  Sims  (1980,  1986).  They
specified  a five dimensional VAR with domestic supply, domestic demand,  exports, ending
stocks,  and average market price of wheat as the variables.20  Note that in a VAR framework,
all  variables  are  endogenous.  The  USITC  estimated  the  five-variable  VAR  model using
quarterly  data from  1979:1  to  1993:2  and  generated  impulse responses  from the model.
Based on their analysis, the USITC concluded that the changes in the supply of durum wheat
due to Canadian exports had not influenced the average US wheat price, and had not affected
program costs to a "statistically significant degree."
This paper is not the proper forum in which to provide a detailed critique of agricultural
commodity modelling and policy analysis.  It is always easier to criticize empirical work than
it is to conduct  high quality analysis.  However, this case illustrates the inherent limitations
of empirical economics.  If the "true" economic model was known,  then it could be used to
determine if the effect of Canadian wheat exports was to lower US wheat prices by one cent
or twelve cents.  Unfortunately,  the "true" model is never known and discrepancies  of a few
cents in the estimation of any impact multiplier,  from different  economic  models, is hardly
surprising or cause for great concern.
In fact, even if we knew the "true"  impact multiplier  for Canadian wheat  imports,  the
outcome of the trade dispute may not have been different in the absence of an exact definition
of "material  interference."  The determination of material interference is a decision made by
the  President,  and  it  is beyond the USITCs jurisdiction.  Consequently, without  a precise
definition  of what  constitutes  material  interference,  does  a  difference  of a few  cents  in
economic estimates really matter?  If  there is a compelling political reason, a price depressing
effect of one cent per bushel could be interpreted  as causing material interference  with the
operation of domestic support programs.
20The USITC VAR-model  did not account  for the US  Export Enhancement  Program,  a
seemingly important omission.
214CASE 4: Canadian  CVD Case Against US Corn
Canada's  CVD case against US corn is interesting  because  it is the  only example of a
successful CVD action against the US  and because it illustrates the use of a public interest
hearing to help in setting the final duty.
Grain corn is grown commercially in only three Canadian provinces:  Ontario,  Quebec and
Manitoba.  Ontario  accounts  for 75-80 percent  of total  Canadian  corn production  which
reached  7.0  million  metric  tons  by  the  late  1980s.  During  the  1970s  Canadian  corn
production increased substantially,  due to the development of short  season hybrids suitable
for cooler  climatic  conditions.  Between  the mid-1970s  and mid-1980s,  Canada  moved
gradually towards self-sufficiency in corn production.  Imports declined from an average of
1.0  million metric  tons  (17  percent  of domestic  production)  during  1978-1980,  to 0.48
million metric tons (7 percent of domestic production)  by  1984-1986.  In fact,  during the
1980s Canada was an occasional net exporter of corn.  The increasing  importance of corn in
Ontario made producers more sensitive to US corn prices  and support programs.  Canada is
the classic small country  price-taker  in the corn market.  Thus, if US farm policies contribute
to  higher corn  production and lower  market prices,  the effect is  quickly transmitted  into
Canada.  Between the 1983-84  and  1986-87 crop years the  average corn price in the US
declined from US$3.25 per bushel to US$1.57 per bushel.  However, corn producers in the
US were largely protected from income losses by a target price that remained  at US$3.03 per
bushel.  While increased  deficiency payments ofUS$1.46 per bushel in 1986-87 protected US
corn producers,  Canadian corn producers received support through a stabilization program
where  support  was  designed  to  ratchet  downward  (95  percent  of the  five-year  moving
average price).
Faced  with  dim prospects  for higher market  prices,  the  newly formed  Ontario  Corn
Producer's  Association  filed  a  CVD  action  against  the  US  in  the  Fall  of  1986.  The
Association alleged that US farm programs for corn had increased production  above what
would have occurred in an unsubsidized  market and that the lower corn prices resulting from
these subsidies were causing material  injury to Canadian corn producers.  Under Canadian
law, Revenue  Canada  determines  if the alleged  product  is  subsidized  and  the size  of the
subsidy.2'  The Canadian  Import  Tribunal  [CIT]  then determines  whether the subsidy  has
caused, is causing, or is likely to cause material injury to domestic producers.
After a preliminary investigation, Revenue  Canada determined that US corn subsidies led
to higher than normal (i.e.,  market determined) production of corn and depressed corn prices.
The countervailable  subsidy was calculated to be US$1.05  per bushel.  This calculated  subsidy
margin was lowered,  in January 1987 to US$0.85 per bushel (Can.$1.10 per bushel).
On March 6,  1987 the CIT determined that imports of subsidized grain corn in all forms,
excluding seed corn, sweet corn and popping corn from the US had caused, was causing and
21Canada's administrative procedures  in a CVD case are very similar to those in the US (van
Duren 1989).
215was likely to cause material injury to Canadian corn producers.  The positive injury finding
is interesting because  injury was found  even though imports of corn, both in absolute  and
relative terms, were declining.  The ruling affirmed  that domestic policies  can "harm"  foreign
producers,  even when imports are not increasing.
The  corn  case  is  also  interesting  for  another reason.  It was  the  first  time the  CIT
conducted  "public  interest"  hearings  where  different  groups,  individuals,  and  businesses
presented  their  views  on  the  likely  impact  of the  CVD  on  their  economic  interests.22
Following these hearings, the CIT advises the Minister of Finance if it is in the public interest
to impose a partial countervailing  duty.  The final decision is made by the Minister of Finance.
During the course of the public interest investigation,  the CIT arranged  public hearings
and received representations from a number of corn users who claimed that imposition of the
CVD would not be in the public interest.  The CIT,  after considering the evidence  advised the
Minister of Finance that the imposition of a CVD on corn imports from the US in excess of
$0.30  per bushel would not be in the public interest.  On February 4,  1988 the Minister  of
Finance  reduced the CVD to $0.46 per bushel.  Hence, the final CVD was set at less than
one-half of the calculated subsidy.  While this determination  did not rely on estimated supply
and demand curves or formal welfare analysis, the result is consistent with the argument that
the proper CVD for domestic subsidies is lower than the subsidy margin.  The public interest
hearings provide a forum where interests of other economic  agents can be taken into account
in a CVD investigation.
Lessons  to be Drawn from the Case Studies
The preceding  case  studies  provide  considerable  "food  for thought."  First,  the legal
arsenal that US industries have to challenge imports they perceive  as being unfairly traded is
impressive.  Second, the quality of the economic analysis used to address the issue of unfairly
traded  imports does not  always  meet professional  standards.  Third,  national  CVD  laws,
dispute  settlement  procedures  developed  within regional  free trade  areas,  and  improved
dispute settlement procedures within the WTO have the potential to conflict  and overlap with
one another, creating  different  bodies of trade law and general  confusion.  There must be a
better way.  A proposal which draws upon the strengths of the recent trade reforms, while
eliminating some of the weaknesses  of the current system, is offered for consideration.  Any
proposal for reform must be judged against its ultimate objectives.  The goal of this proposal
is to  move the world economy towards more  liberal and predictable  international  trade in
agrifood products.  At the same time, it allows domestic industries to have recourse against
imports "unfairly"  subsidized  by  foreign governments.  However,  the rules used  in trade
disputes  should  be transparent, the  economic  analysis underpinning  the decisions  beyond
reproach, and the process as timely and as harassment free as possible.  This is a tall order -
but a worthy objective.
22Since  1984 the CIT has been required to hold public interest hearings  in CVD cases.
216Before proceeding,  it is useful to review the current status of agriculture within the WTO.
The WTO has taken on the responsibility of monitoring and policing the AAA.  This  involves
making sure countries live up to their export subsidy reduction  commitments, do not exceed
their calculated  aggregate  measure of support,  and that the minimum access  commitments
specified in the various  country schedules are upheld.  In addition, the WTO will be  called
upon to make rulings with  regard to  countries  using innovative  tactics to  circumvent  the
commitments  they  have  made.  The  WTO  also  sets the  ground  rules  for  national  CVD
investigations  and  it  will  get more  heavily  involved  in  these  disputes  as  a  result  of its
"policeman's"  role  with  regard  to  the  AAA.  The  AAA  contains  the  exceptions  for
agricultural products from the Agreement  on Subsidies and Countervailing  Measures,  which
governs trade in manufactured  products.  Table  1 and Table  2 show the rules of the WTO,
in condensed form,  as they apply to CVD investigations of manufactured  and agricultural
products.  For manufactured  goods  export  subsidies  and  domestic  use  regulations  are
prohibited.  For agriculture only export subsidies on "new" goods not identified in a country's
tariff schedule  are prohibited.
For manufactured products,  actionable  subsidies and a presumption of serious prejudice
include to ad valorem  subsidies greater  than 5 percent,  government  debt forgiveness,  and
subsidies to cover an industry's operating losses.  For agriculture, actionable  subsidies include
export subsidies and some forms of specific domestic  subsidies.
The list of "non-actionable"  subsidies for manufactured  products  is relatively short.  It
includes generally available  subsidies,  as well  as specific  subsidies for research assistance to
developed  regions  and  assistance  to  promote the  adoption  of existing  facilities  to  new
environmental  requirements.  Even for these subsidies,  there are restrictions applied to the
allowable expenditures.  For agriculture,  the list of non-actionable  subsidies is much longer.
Most  notably,  it  allows  subsidies  to  farmers  through  direct  payments  and  financial
participation in safety net  programs,  as long as these programs meet certain  criteria.  The
result  of these differences,  in the way subsidies  on manufactured  goods and  subsidies  on
agricultural products are handled,  means that in many cases national administered  protection
agencies decisions on agrifood CVDs will be appealed to the WTO. 23  While this makes work
for lawyers and perhaps even economists,  it is not a healthy  situation for industries that are
attempting to  sell their products internationally.  To  a large extent this justifies the WTO
becoming the sole dispute settlement body for CVDs.
23For example, any new Canadian income stabilization plan will be developed with a close eye
on the "green" criteria of the WTO.  If these programs are treated  as commodity specific, in
a US trade action, Canada will appeal the ruling to the WTO.
217Table 1.  WTO  rules  as  they  apply  to  subsidies  and  countervailing  measures:
manufactured products
Prohibited Subsidies
Government Transfers  of Funds, Revenue Foregone,  or Provision of Services other
than General Infrastructure to a Specific Industry




Ad Valorem Subsidization Exceeds 5 percent'
Subsidies to Cover an Industries Operating Losses'
Forgiveness of Government Held Debt'
Non-Actionable  Subsidies
Generally Available  Subsidies
Specific  Subsidies Which Met the Following  Conditions:
ad valorem subsidization less than  1 percent
assistance  for research activities if the assistance covers not more than 75 percent
of the costs of industrial research or 50 percent of the costs of pre-competitive
development activity'
assistance to disadvantaged regions, based on specified development  criteria2
assistance to promote adoption of existing facilities to new environmental
requirements,  provided the assistance is limited to 20 percent of the cost of
adoption2
'These subsidies must also be shown to have trade effects  as described in the Agreement  on
Subsidies  and Countervailing Measures.
2Other conditions apply.
218Table 2.  WTO  rules  as  they  apply  to  subsidies  and  countervailing  measures:
agriculture
Prohibited Subsidies
Export Subsidies on Products not Identified  in the Country's Schedule of Commitments
Actionable  Subsidies
Ad Valorem Product Specific  Support exceeds 5 percent
Ad Valorem Product Specific  Support 1 percent - 5 percent'
Ad Valorem Non-Specific 2 Support exceeds 1 percent'
Direct Payments under Production Limiting Programs'
Export Subsidies on Products Specified in the Countries Schedule of Commitments'
Non-Actionable  Subsidies
Generally Available  Subsidies
Ad Valorem  Subsidization less than  1 percent
General Services:
research
pest and disease control
training services
extension and advisory  services
inspection  services
marketing and promotion  services
infrastructure
Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes
Domestic Food Aid
Direct Payments to Producers through Decoupled Income Support
Government Financial Participation  in Income Insurance and Income Safety-Net Programs
payments for relief from natural disasters
structural  adjustment assistance  provided through:
producer retirement programs
resource  retirement programs
investment  aids
Payments Under Environmental Programs
Payments Under Regional Assistance Programs
Specific  Subsidies which Meet the Following Conditions:
assistance for research activities if the assistance covers not more than 75 percent of the costs of industrial research
or 50 percent of the costs of pre-competitive development activity
assistance to disadvantaged  regions, based on specified development criteria
assistance to promote adoption of existing facilities to new environmental requirements, provided the assistance is
limited to 20 percent of the cost of adoption
'With  a determination of injury and "due restraint" must be shown in bringing a case.
2The term non-specific is used in the context of  Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
219If the WTO is going to become the primary judicial body to deal with CVDs - is there still
a role for national administered protection agencies,  like the USITC and CITT?  There is, if
these agencies  are given a different mandate.  A redefined  mandate for national administered
protection agencies would facilitate increasingly liberal trade compared to their current role
as protectors of national interests.
What should be the new role for the national administered  protection agencies?  It would
involve  them  having  three  primary  functions:  1]  as  a  "transparency"  agent;  2]  as  an
investigatory  agent;  and 3] as an advocacy  agent.
The  call  for a  "transparency"  agency  is  far  from  original  having been  made  by both
Leutwiler and Long.  Leutwiler suggested the agency should operate at the international level
and Long at the national level.  The objective of these agencies would be to calculate  and
publicize the  costs and benefits of various domestic and trade policies.  Leutwiler called this
a "protection  balance  sheet"  and the model  generally  held up  as a  shining  example  is  the
Australian  Industry Commission.  The argument  is that good economic policy can only be
made  in the full light of day - where the disparate costs of domestic and trade policies  are
made as apparent as the concentrated  benefits of most policy actions (Spriggs  1991).  In the
agrifood  sector,  the calculation  and  publication of producer subsidy  equivalents  has been
helpful in exposing the horrendous international costs of agricultural support policies, and in
illustrating  the  comparative  costs  across  commodity  sectors  within national  economies.
Domestic  cross  commodity  estimates  are  important  when  protection  in  some  sectors  is
provided by hidden policies,  such as import and tariff rate quotas, while the protection for
other sectors is in the form of highly visible output and input subsidies.  The role of a national
transparency agency is considerably  different than that of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
created within the WTO.  The WTOs trade policy reviews are designed to examine the impact
of a member's trade  policies on the multilateral trading system.  The transparency  agencies
mandate would be to examine the impact of their own countries domestic and trade policies
on their own consumers, producers and taxpayers.  In this way, the national agencies become
advocates for trade liberalization.  To properly fulfill this role, the national agencies need to
be  removed,  to the  extent  possible,  from  the political  process.  At  times,  the economic
analysis of  the transparency  agency will be popular with politicians, but many times it won't.
For  this  reason,  the  analysis  should  be  undertaken  by  a  domestic  as  opposed  to  an
international  body.  It is just too easy to ignore "foreign"  economic  advice.  However,  in
order to maintain political support the agency would need other roles.24
The second role for redefined national  administered protection agencies would be as an
investigatory agent.  Domestically this is consistent with the transparency function since doing
quality economic analysis requires top flight institutional knowledge.  National administered
protection agencies might undertake  studies of foreign governments  and foreign government
policies as well as domestic policies.  This would serve two purposes.  First, like a section 332
24We will leave it to those in public administration to decide if the separate roles we envisage
can coexist in a single agency.  We believe they can and that there are good reasons for doing
so; e.g., the sharing of common knowledge about economics, industries and institutions.
220investigation,  it would provide a bone to throw to domestic vested interests.  It is also always
helpful when the President or Prime Minister can  say, "there is an investigation underway."
In many cases these investigations may absolve the foreign government  of any wrong doing.
In other cases, the investigation  might uncover unfair trade practices.  Models for this type
of activity  could be the analyses that the Australian Bureau  of Agricultural  and Resource
Economics  undertook  of the  US  and EC  agricultural  policies.  It  might  also  mirror  the
economic  analysis undertaken by the Canada-United  States Joint Commission  on Grain.
Finally, national administered protection  agencies would have  a third role as an advocacy
agent.  This role would  mirror  the  current mandate  of national  administered  protection
agencies.  Domestic industries that felt they were being harmed by foreign subsidies would
approach  the agency  indicating  they wanted  to take  action  against a  foreign government
subsidy  in the  WTO.  The  advocacy  agency  would  undertake  economic  analysis  of the
industry's claim.  Hopefully,  the agency could filter out false or weak claims and refer enough
others  to the investigatory  agency that  only a relatively few  cases would  be taken to the
WTO.  At this point, the agency would become the spokesperson for the domestic industry.
It would prepare state-of-the-art  economic analysis to back up the domestic  industry's claims.
There are several potential shortcomings of this proposal.  First, that the WTO would be
overwhelmed by cases.  This might be a problem even under the current rules, as more and
more disputes are taken to the WTO.  However,  it is not clear that the proposal would result
in more  cases.  In fact,  if the advocacy agency  is doing  its job  it should  filter out  a large
number of the smaller and less significant cases before they ever reach the WTO.  A second
objection, is that it might discriminate against poor,  less developed  countries.  This is a non-
issue.  What could be more difficult,  for any country,  than attempting  to defend itself in a
foreign nation under their unique rules and institutions?  At least  at the WTO everyone would
be following a common set of procedures  and rules.  Poorer countries could pool resources
to hire  lawyers  and  economists  to  make their  case  in  Geneva.  They  would  not require
different teams of lawyers in the US, Canada and the EU.  Finally, the proposal would require
that the WTO develop legal and economic talent to undertake the enhanced mandate.  This
is essentially  an institutional issue that can be handled with the proper provision of resources,
training and manpower.
By far the biggest objection to the proposal  is that national governments,  particularly the
US,  will  never concede  so  much authority  to  a  foreign body.  While  it  is  difficult  to be
optimistic on this score, there is  some hope for progress.  With the expansion of regional
trading agreements  and their attendant  dispute  settlement  mechanisms,  and the increasing
propensity to take disputes to the WTO,  it may become obvious that three different  levels of
dispute settlement are inefficient and counterproductive.  With the increasing complexity of
dispute settlement it is possible progress can be made in this area during the next round of
multilateral trade negotiations.
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